This paper analyzes daily patterns in the settlement of payments in the European
INTRODUCTION
Understanding the patterns in and the timing of payments is of particular relevance to operators and overseers of any payment system. Large deviations from the average trend can be identified and their impact can be assessed. Appropriate countermeasures can then be taken, if deemed necessary. Following a liquidity shock, banks can
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intentionally shift their large-value payments during the late afternoon. This hampers liquidity circulation and increases the overall level of operational risk. Possibilities for reacting to this and for bringing the situation back to preshock levels include lowering the cost of liquidity, introducing throughput guidelines and setting time-varying tariffs (for an overview on the topic, see, for example, Rochet (2005, 2006) , Bech (2008) and Ota (2011) ).
The purpose of this paper is to characterize settlement patterns and timing of payments in the European large-value payment system TARGET2, and to identify whether the crises and the adoption of emergency policy measures have affected payment flow. We provide insight into the most critical periods for the system in terms of both volume and value of payments introduced and settled. We also characterize the average intraday throughput, processing time and performance of the system, defined as the percentage of payments settled within five minutes.
Our analysis is based on a unique set of transaction-level data that enables us to give a detailed characterization of the intraday patterns of payments for the period from January 2008 until December 2011. TARGET2 processes a large variety of payments, including customer payments, interbank payments and payments related to ancillary systems. We focus primarily on interbank payments, ie, transactions where both the real originator and the final beneficiary are credit institutions, because of their high average value, the importance of their recipients and the most endogenous choice of timing they convey.
In the payments literature, several authors have studied the timing and intraday trends of the US large-value payment system, Fedwire. The timing of Fedwire funds transfers was first documented by McAndrews and Rajan (2000) . The authors identify a very high concentration of payments in the late afternoon and explain this as a coordination game between banks to minimize the cost of sending payments by using incoming funds to finance outgoing transactions. In the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001 , the coordination game broke down and liquidity shortages developed at many banks (McAndrews and Potter (2002) ). The swift intervention of the Federal Reserve helped to restore payments activity and synchronization. More recently, Armantier et al (2008) studied the impact of several changes in the Fedwire operating environment 1 and Bech et al (2012) analyzed the effects of Federal Reserve policy measures in response to the crisis. Similar contributions have also been provided for other large-value payment systems in modern economies, specifically in the British Clearing House Automated Payment System (CHAPS) (see Becher et al (2008) and Benos et al (2012) ) and the Canadian Large-Value Transfer System (LVTS) (see Arjani (2006) and Roberts (2011) ). However, while the cross-country dimension of payment flows has been explored for the TARGET2 predecessor (Rosati and Secola (2006) ), 2 the intraday patterns of TARGET2 payments have never been characterized at this level of depth, and this particular payment class has never been the focus. This paper aims to fill this gap and to provide valuable information to the central bank in its role of operator and overseer of the payment system. This paper is organized as follows. First we provide a general overview of the TARGET2 system and describe the TARGET2 payment categories in Section 2. We then proceed to analyze volumes and values and their patterns, focusing on interbank payments in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss the intraday trends and the timing of interbank payments and settlement delays. Section 5 concludes.
AN OVERVIEW OF TARGETTRANSACTION-LEVEL DATA

General overview
TARGET2 is the Eurosystem real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system for payments in euro currency. In its current setup, it is a young system that commenced operations on November 19, 2007, gradually superseding its predecessor TARGET. The first group of countries was composed of Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta and Slovenia. Other countries joined later in distinct migration waves. The data set includes only payments processed in the core module, the payment module. Transactions processed in the proprietary home accounts or in the home 2 TARGET data has also been used by Galos and Soramäki (2005) in a counterfactual analysis of systemic consequences of a bank's insolvency in different payment system setups. 3 Access to transaction-level data and the establishment of the TARGET2 Simulation Project is based on a decision by the Governing Council from July 29, 2010 (European Central Bank (2010b ). In particular, access to and use of transaction-level data is limited to a small group of designated staff members from the National Central Banks and the European Central Bank for oversight and operational purposes, ie, the Group of Authorised Overseers and the Group of Users from the Operational Side. account modules are not reported. Payments processed in TARGET2 can be divided into four main categories:
(1) customer and interbank payments;
(2) payments from/to central banks;
(3) payments related to the settlement of ancillary systems such as other payment systems or securities and clearing settlement systems (SCSSs);
(4) liquidity transfers between payment systems, or between different accounts of the same participants. Table 1 lists the average daily values and volumes of payments settled in each of these categories. It can be clearly seen that customer and interbank payments dominate all other categories in terms of volume, while the largest contribution to the overall daily settlement value comes from categories 3 and 4 (ancillary systems and liquidity transfers). This is due to the high values originating from ancillary SCSSs and to large-value transfers between accounts of a participant. In the remainder of the paper these transactions will be excluded from the analysis. On the one hand, as liquidity shifts do not constitute a change of ownership of the money transferred, it may be worthwhile focusing on them purely from a liquidity management perspective. On the other hand, as the main focus of this study is on timing of payments, including ancillary system transactions could misrepresent the results. More specifically, the choice of timing is often completely exogenous, as there are precise settlement cycles for each ancillary system. Furthermore, the highest priority is assigned to all payments related to ancillary systems, thereby allowing them to avoid the same queueing as those of interbank payments. 
Category 1 and 2 payments
The characteristic structure of the TARGET2 payment system can be best understood by looking at the composition of incoming payments over the course of the day, as illustrated in Figure 1 . We plot the total value of all payments within a ten-minute interval against the time for which the execution of the payment was scheduled. 4 The most striking feature of the graph is the extremely pronounced peak in the value of submitted payments at 07:00 when the TARGET2 daytime processing period begins and the system starts settling payments. This is due to the large number of transactions sent to the system before opening (backlog) or right at the beginning of operations. It is very likely that some transactions are related to the automatic repayment of overnight loans. However, the majority of these are due to specific payment habits of participants that send most of their payments at 07:00 or soon after. The subsequent intraday pattern, until the cutoff time for customer payments at 17:00, is relatively smooth and almost completely driven by interbank and customer payments. The last hour before the interbank cutoff time at 18:00 exhibits a modest increase in total value which is due to payments made in the context of interbank lending and overnight liquidity management. Finally, from 18:00 until 18:45, TARGET2 performs the endof-day processing, which includes access to the standing facility of the Eurosystem. At 18:45, the next TARGET2 business day opens and at 19:30 the night settlement phase begins. When SCSS-related transactions are excluded from the analysis, category 1 payments drive the total value of TARGET2 for the majority of the day. Category 1 can be further split into payments where both the final beneficiary and the real originator are credit institutions (interbank payments) and payments where at least one of the two parties is not a credit institution (customer payments). A look at Figure 2 unveils a very clear picture: despite the high number of customer payments, their contribution to total value is marginal compared with that of interbank payments. This follows logically given the fact that interbank payments have an average value of almost €10 million per payment, which is thirteen times more than that of an average customer payment.
The dominance of interbank payments in terms of value also guides our decision to concentrate on this payment class for the analysis in the subsequent sections of this paper. There are several other reasons to focus on interbank payments. First, we think of interbank payments as being particularly relevant due to their high average value, especially in low-liquidity situations. Second, we believe that the timely settlement of these payments is of particular relevance for the system as a whole due to the fragility and potential systemic importance of their recipients, which (by definition) are banks themselves. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we expect participants to have more discretion over the submission of payments which they make in their own name than over customer payments, due to straight-through processing mechanisms or other contractual obligations. Thus, we believe that interbank payments convey the endogenous choice of timing by the system participants better than any other payment class. In the next section we present a full set of descriptive statistics for interbank payments, together with a more extensive analysis of their intraday patterns.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Volumes and values
TARGET2 processes a large number of transactions, with a turnover, in value, of one-third of European GDP for every day of operations. Focusing only on interbank transactions, on average there are about 68 000 payments per day, with a daily average value of more than €641 billion. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the daily volume and value. It shows that the distribution of payments volume is right-skewed and clearly not normal, whereas the distribution of payments value is centered around its mean and presents less variability. Part (a) of Figure 3 on the next page depicts the number of all interbank payments, together with the five-day moving average (black line). Part (b) depicts the series and the five-day moving average of the value of all transactions. The first pronounced spike in both series is due to the second wave of countries joining the system. We do not observe a similar spike on the day of the third wave of countries joining TARGET2. Concerning the series of the value of transactions, after the initial spike, we see a substantial decline until November 2009 -a probable effect of the crisis. This is followed by an increase until May 2010 and a second decline of smaller magnitude until the end of the sample. The latter does not apply for the number of interbank transactions, where a long-term average of about 68 000 transactions is observed.
Small-value payments
Despite being a large-value payment system, more than half of all settled interbank payments in TARGET2 are less than €100 000. 5 Part (a) of Figure 4 on the facing page depicts the time series of the fraction of payments smaller than €100 000 and the relative five-day moving average (black line). The series is clearly nonstationary and exhibits high volatility, ranging from 55% to 75% on single days. The plot of the five-day moving average shows more clearly that the series peaks in the second half of 2009 and stays around 65% until the end of the sample. Finally, it is worth noting that the 2009 trend in small-value payments coincides with a marked decrease in the daily value settled (see Figure 3) . As the volume of transactions did not deviate from its long-term average during 2009, this suggests that few very large-value payments have failed to take place. Possible reasons for this are the aftermath of the crisis, the 
The black lines represent the five-day moving averages.
decrease in money market activity and the change of payment system used for settling large transactions by some banks. Part (b) of Figure 4 depicts the percentage of low-value payments in terms of value. The percentage itself is clearly very low. However, the most intriguing finding is that peaks occur with a regular frequency. A closer look reveals that those days are the days following a "triple witching day", ie, the third Friday of every March, June, September and December.
6 These days represent the expiration time of three different types of securities, namely, stock market index futures, stock market index options and stock options. For practical purposes, index options and futures are generally cash-settled as transferring hundreds of underlying stocks would entail very high transportation costs and fees. Hence, only the corresponding amount in cash is transferred and settlement usually takes place the day following the last trading day of the option or futures contract. The percentage of small-value payments in terms of value doubles in proximity of the "triple witching day". The result is somehow striking, as one would expect this to apply for customer payments and not for interbank transactions. The larger contribution in terms of value observed on the business day following the "triple witching day" suggests that banks are largely involved in stock market index futures and single-stock futures trading, either directly or acting on behalf of their customer banks. Finally, this connection seems to become weaker during the course of 2010 and to almost disappear in 2011, as the peaks in part (b) of Figure 4 on the preceding page are less pronounced. A more refined analysis is needed to understand the motivation for this decline. Nevertheless, the identification of the link between trading activity on financial markets and interbank payments clearly shows the hidden potential of payments data and the possibility of observing patterns and trends in participants' behavior related to financial markets as a whole.
As a final analysis, we provide the time series plot of the median size of interbank payments settled in TARGET2. As can be seen in part (a) of Figure 5 on the facing page, the median size of transactions varies between €10 000 and €50 000, with a long-term average of about €20 000, confirming the outcome presented in Figure 4 on the preceding page. Note that this is very close to the US$17 000 median size of a payment in Fedwire (European Central Bank (2010a)). 
Payments value distribution
An interesting feature, linked to the fraction of low-value payments, is the distribution of payments. We fit a lognormal distribution to the series of interbank payments value for each day. The Jarque-Bera, the Shapiro-Wilk and the Anderson-Darling tests reject the hypothesis of normality, and therefore a different distribution may be more appropriate. Using the Nelder-Mead optimization algorithm we fit a Student t distribution without constraints, a Student t distribution with five degrees of freedom and a gamma distribution without constraints to the logarithm of the value for each day. 8 We find that the gamma distribution fits the daily value of transactions better in terms of higher log-likelihood. The gamma distribution can be fully described by two parameters: the shape parameter k and the scale parameter Â. The mean is equal to the product of k and Â and the variance is equal to kÂ 2 .
Figure 6 on page 14 presents the fitted shape parameter (part (a)) and the fitted scale parameter (part (b)). It is worthwhile noting the recurrent spikes (respectively, troughs) for the shape (respectively, scale) parameter, occurring again on the "triple witching day" or on the following business day, as well as their magnitude. Toward 
The interval size is fifteen minutes.
the end of the sample, the spikes (respectively, troughs) are less pronounced compared with the beginning of the sample, as observed in Figure 4 on page 11. An increase in the shape parameter indicates an increase in the dispersion of the distribution (ie, the distribution allows for more extreme values), while a decrease in the scale parameter leads to a more concentrated distribution. The effects are therefore of opposite side and seem to balance each other. Nevertheless, we observe a change in the mean and variance of the average value of the logarithm of payments (see Figure 7 on page 15). The mean changes in accordance with the findings of Figure 3 on page 10 and Figure 4 on page 11. The variance presents the same troughs as the scale parameter, thereby indicating that its large decline is not offset by the large increase in the shape parameter. Hence, during this period, the distribution of payments is less extreme compared with the other days.
TIMING OF PAYMENTS
Timing information is very relevant for overseers and operators: a smooth functioning of the payment system and a timely settlement of obligations are clear indicators of the effectiveness of an RTGS system, particularly in terms of liquidity requirements. We study interbank payment timing by looking at three different dimensions. First, we describe the intraday patterns of payments, for both volume and value. Second, we compute the difference in seconds between introduction and settlement time and we study its intraday trend. We define this difference as "settlement delay". Finally, we look at the percentage of interbank payments settled within five minutes of their introduction into the system, as a proxy for system's performance.
Intraday pattern of payments
For operational and oversight purposes it is of particular importance to study the behavior of payments during the day. Should deviations from the average trend arise, these can be identified, their impact can be assessed and, if necessary, appropriate countermeasures can be taken. Time-varying tariffs as in the Swiss Interbank Clearing (the Swiss payment system), throughput guidelines as in the CHAPS and nonstandard monetary policy measures aiming at improving liquidity buffers of a system's participants are some of the actions the central bank could take. The TARGET2 day trade phase starts at 07:00 and ends at 18:00 (interbank cutoff). Figure 8 on page 16 depicts the intraday daily average of volume (see part (a)) and value (see part (b)) for the four years included in the sample, dividing the hours of operation into bins of fifteen minutes. 9 It is interesting to see that the largest number of payments (in volume and value) is settled within the first hour. However, these are payments of relatively small value compared with the few settled in the last hour. We then observe similar trends for both series. The initial spike is followed by a slow but constant decrease, usually interrupted on the hour (ie, 09:00, 10:00, etc). This could be due to the liquidity coming from the settlement of ancillary systems such as the settlement of SSSs, central securities depositories or central clearing counterparties. The hump occurring shortly after 16:00 coincides with the settlement of the net positions of EURO1 and other ancillary systems. In the last hour and a half of operations the number of payments is very small, but large in value, hence, the average value of payments increases significantly.
As a comparison, the intraday behavior of payments is reminiscent of the patterns observed in the CHAPS (Becher et al (2008) ) and is sharply distinct from the endof-day bunching of payments that has been reported for Fedwire (McAndrews and Rajan (2000) and Armantier et al (2008) ). This is due to the different policies for The interval size is fifteen minutes.
access to intraday credit. In Fedwire, overdrafts are costly only when outstanding at fifty-nine seconds after the minute. 10 Therefore, when a participant is able to use incoming payments to offset outgoing payments, its access to the overdraft facility can be limited. Hence, one observes a coordination among banks to gather payments around the end of the day in order to be able to use this inexpensive source of funding. On the other hand, in TARGET2 intraday credit is granted free upon collateralization of a wide range of eligible assets. The implicit opportunity cost of posting collateral at the reference central bank has decreased substantially in the last few years, as the list of eligible assets has been expanded to include a wide range of debt securities. Therefore, the opportunity cost can be considered to be sufficiently inexpensive. Thus, we do not observe the same end-of-day bunching of payments, as the coordination game between market participants is no longer necessary. We see that payments are sent early in the morning, as predicted by the model of Angelini (1998) for the case when intraday credit is free or sufficiently inexpensive. This also confirms the results of Bech and Garratt (2003) and Mills and Nesmith (2008) , where the authors demonstrate that the cost of intraday liquidity, among other things, drives the timing decision of participants. It is also very interesting to note the robustness of the intraday patterns of volume and value over different years. Such stability is important since it facilitates the identification of days or periods for which the intraday patterns deviate substantially from the average behavior.
From an oversight and operational perspective, the system faces two main challenges. On the one hand, in the morning the system has to process a very large number of payments. This poses a problem in terms of backlogging of payments in the queue. On the other hand, in the evening the system has to process a small number of payments of very large value. This poses a problem in terms of liquidity needs. This is confirmed by the plot in part (b) of Figure 5 on page 13. The intraday median size of payments equals about €100 000 until cutoff for customer payments, after which it increases substantially, exhibiting a very large peak during 2008. This is due to a few days that are evenly spread in the year in which very large end-of-day payments occurred. Hence, from an oversight and operational perspective, the first few hours from the opening of the system and the last hour before closing are definitely the most crucial.
Another way to describe intraday patterns is to look at the system's throughput. Unlike in other systems such as EURO1 and CHAPS, in TARGET2 there are no throughput guidelines, ie, there is no set of rules that defines the minimum percentage value/volume of a participant's daily payment flow that must be submitted/settled by a particular time. Therefore, the intraday cumulative distribution of volume and value represents the participants'unconstrained time choice. Figure 9 on the next page depicts the average cumulative intraday distribution of volume and value. The figure shows that more than 60% of payments in terms of volume and value are settled before noon. This is a positive feature for an RTGS system, as liquidity becomes available early and banks have more time to react to a potential liquidity shortage. The figure also shows that neither distribution varies much between years, implying that participants' timings did not change.
Settlement delay
Being an RTGS system, in TARGET2 all payments are, conditional on the available liquidity, settled immediately; otherwise they remain queued until the required funds become available. It is important to note that in TARGET2 there are no explicit rules that require payments to be settled within a certain time, nor is there a unique definition of settlement delay. In this respect, settlement delay can also be defined as processing or execution time, without losing its intrinsic meaning, ie, a payment introduced into the system and not processed instantly, but queued for several reasons. These reasons can have a behavioral component (bilateral or multilateral limits reached), an 
economic motivation (liquidity shortage) or be of an operational nature (eg, technical slowdowns in a system's performance). 11 Moreover, our definition differs from the one expressed in European Central Bank (2011), where settlement delay refers specifically to technical processing time, ie, all payments queued due to lack of liquidity or breach of the limits are excluded from the calculation, together with payments introduced in the first hour of operations. Additionally, it is important to note that the time of day in which delays occur and who the participants affected by these delays are may have different impacts and consequences in the settlement process. On the one hand, for medium-to large-sized banks, a few payments delayed at the beginning of operations can have a rather negligible impact on the payment flow and settlement, whereas they may have a disruptive impact around close of operations. On the other hand, smaller banks that rely on funding their accounts with incoming payments may experience a liquidity shortage when delays become larger, and may thus require access to the overdraft facility. The interval size is fifteen minutes.
We define settlement delay as the difference between the time a payment has been introduced into the system and the time the payment has been successfully settled. Settlement delay can be an indicator of how the system is performing, of how much liquidity is needed and of whether or not the system is experiencing a period of stress. When a market participant sends a payment message, it can decide whether to specify the earliest and latest debit time. The former allows one participant, for example, to send a payment message at 07:00, setting the earliest debit time at 10:00. This means that, although the payment message has already been sent to the system at 07:00, the payment cannot be settled before the earliest debit time (in this case at 10:00). Furthermore, payment messages can be sent to the system before the start of the settlement operations. In this case we consider the start of operations (ie, 07:00) as the introduction time. Thus, we define the introduction time as the maximum period between the time the payment has been sent to the system, the earliest debit time and the opening of the system. Figure 10 plots the average intraday settlement delay. The plot of settlement delay exhibits a similar behavior across different years. However, its magnitude is very distinct in 2008, where the average settlement delay peaks for almost one hour. This The interval size is fifteen minutes.
is also confirmed in the cumulative distribution of value settled in 2008 (see Figure 9 on page 18), which is on average 4% less than that of later years. It is interesting to note that the series for 2009, 2010 and 2011 seem to be rescalings of the series for 2008. In particular, we observe a buildup of settlement delay from the first hour of operations until noon, after which the series fade out to zero. This may be partly explained by several large banks setting their limits to zero (ie, removing them) around noon. The opening peak is followed by subsequent decreases and increases right before 08:00, 10:00 and 12:00. These are due to interbank payments that occur immediately before the settlement of ancillary systems. It is worth noting that, on average, we do not observe a peak in interbank payments after 16:00, when the deferred net settlement system EURO1 settles its end-of-day balances in TARGET2. Finally, right before close of operations, there is a small increase in settlement delay. This is mainly due to the few payments introduced and their large value, possibly indicating a small liquidity shortage. One limitation of the simple average of processing time is that it does not take into account the value of the delayed transaction. In principle, a payment of €100 delayed for one hour may have a negligible impact compared with a payment of €1 billion delayed for the same amount of time. On the other hand, by looking at weighted averages, few large-value payments could distort the average delay upward. Hence, when looking at settlement delay, one should keep this reasoning in mind. We present the intraday pattern of settlement delay, weighted by value, in Figure 11 on the facing page. The plot shows that, once the delay is weighted using the value of the delayed transaction, the yearly series are more aligned than before, all peaking right before noon, where large transactions take place, and fading out to zero at a slower pace than that observed in Figure 10 on page 19. Thus, our conclusions that the morning hours are the most crucial in terms of settlement delay are robust to a value-weighted analysis. In fact, delays become even more accentuated relative to the nonweighted delays. Finally, it is worth noting that the magnitude of the series is decreasing through time, leading to significant efficiency gains and diminished operational risks. Two valid explanations for this result are a better liquidity management of the banks (learning curve) and the outcome of the liquidity injections in the system by the central banks, facilitating the timely settlement of the obligations. Earlier settlement has also recently been observed in Fedwire (Bech et al (2012) ) and has been similarly explained by the adoption of emergency policy measures.
As a final indicator, we consider the percentage of interbank payments settled within five minutes of their introduction (see Figure 12 on the next page). Initially, the series fluctuates around 72%. Then, from end of September 2008, when the European Central Bank announced its first emergency measure following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy -a special term refinancing operation that allotted €120 billion -the percentage is around 76% until the end of March 2010. From that point it rises to a new long-term average of about 80%, with particular emphasis after the beginning of May, when the first loan package for Greece is agreed and the European Central Bank announces a change in the eligibility of debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the Greek government. Once again, abundant liquidity injections and reductions in the implicit opportunity cost of posting collateral favored earlier settlement by increasing the liquidity buffer of market participants. It is also interesting to note a recurrent start-of-the-year effect: while the percentage of payments settled within five minutes decreases significantly in the last days of the year, it bounces back right at the beginning of the year.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have analyzed intraday patterns and timings of bank-to-bank (ie, a subset of all TARGET2 transactions) payments in the European large-value payment system TARGET2, from January 2008 until December 2011. To the best of our knowledge it is the first study to use euro-wide TARGET2 data.
The daily volume series shows that the system processes on average 68 000 interbank payments, whereas the daily value settled exhibits periods of declines and increases. Next, we focused on low-value payments, ie, payments below the €100 000 threshold. We found that, despite its nature, the system processes a large number of small-value payments. In addition, we observed recurrent peaks in the percentage of small-value payments in terms of value occurring around the "triple witching days". A similar behavior is observed in the shape and scale parameters when fitting a gamma distribution to the logarithm of the value of payments. The mean changes in accordance with the average value settled in TARGET2. The variance presents the same troughs as the scale parameter, thereby indicating that its large decline is not offset by the large increase in the shape parameter. Hence, on those days, the distribution of payments is more concentrated than in other days. This result also hints at the existence of a link between trading activity on financial markets and interbank payments, and shows the possibility of understanding intraday patterns and participants' behavior in financial markets using payments data.
Next, we concentrated on the intraday patterns of payments. From an oversight and operational perspective, we found that the first hour and a half and the last hour are the most crucial times during the hours of operation of the system, in terms of number of payments processed (opening) and value of payments (closing).
12 The distribution of payments over the day is found to be remarkably constant over time. We then focused on the timing of payments, looking in particular at settlement delay, that is, the time elapsed between a payment being introduced into the system and its final settlement. We found that settlement delay is usually higher during the morning and lower during the afternoon, with spikes occurring right before the hours in the morning, when ancillary systems have their settlement cycles. This picture also remains intact when delays are weighted by value. The steady decrease of settlement delay from 2008 to 2011 is due to the implementation of emergency policy measure used by the European Central Bank. Similar results have also been observed in the US large-value payment system, Fedwire. Finally, the stability of the observed patterns of settlement delay over time impressively documents the resilience of the TARGET2 payment system to periods of financial distress. Neither the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy nor the unfolding of the sovereign debt crisis had any permanent negative impact on settlement delay and the functioning of the TARGET2 payment system.
In conclusion, this study describes the typical patterns of the system in terms of volume and value settled and in terms of settlement delay. Besides its purely descriptive nature, it can help overseers and operators to assess the impact of deviations from the usual behavior, as the system has proved to be very consistent over time. Should these deviations hamper liquidity circulation, increase operational risk or hinder the smooth functioning of the payment system, appropriate corrective actions can be taken. Furthermore, this study can also serve as a basis for a second-step analysis of the identification of early warning indicators using payments data. As a future avenue of research, anecdotal evidence indicates that participants in different countries follow different behavior with regards to payments timing and liquidity management. It would surely be relevant to enhance this study by looking at the geographical dimension when identifying differences in behavior between countries or among different banking categories and/or communities.
